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Mr Singh argued that this was not a 'no fault motor accident' because it was caused by the fault of another person, namely the person or persons who negligently loaded the container.
The insurer submitted that the words "any other person" in s 5.1 should be read down to leave open that a motor accident could still attract the definition of 'no fault' if it was to some degree caused or contributed outside the class of 'any other person'. However, the Court held that such an interpretation is impossible, even if the effect is that s 5.6 is rendered redundant. The Court concluded at [23]:
"As the words "not caused by the fault of any other person" in s 5.1 mean just what they say, it follows that the accident in the present case was not "no fault" and therefore s 5.2(1) does not apply."
The Court went on to determine that even if s 5.2(1) applied, that provision distinguishes between fault in the causation of injury and fault in the causation of the accident. His Honour explained, at [24]:
"It does so in order to deem fault in the causation of injury (and hence to create a path of liability) in the case of "no‑fault motor accidents", where there is by statutory definition no fault in the causation of the accident and where the legislature has apparently deliberately chosen not to deem fault in the causation of the accident. An aspect of the scheme of Part 3 is that fault in causing the accident is the criterion for terminating statutory benefits at 26 weeks. That scheme would be subverted if a section located in Part 5 (dealing with accidents not caused by anyone's fault) should operate to deem fault in the causation of the accident for the purposes of the limit on statutory benefits. In my view s 5.2(1) does not so operate."
Because s 3.2(5) did not deem Mr Singh at fault and as this was not a no‑fault accident otherwise invoking Part 5, the Claims Assessor's decision was upheld, and the summons was dismissed.
Why this case is important
The Supreme Court has questioned why the legislature considered it necessary to enact s 3.2(5). According to Fagan J, the only rational interpretation is that its purpose is to deem that the additional statutory obligation is within the insuring clause, and no more.
Similarly, the Supreme Court has highlighted the contradiction between s 5.1 and s 5.6, urging Parliament to give them "careful and detailed reconsideration", if a "spate of litigation generated by the obscurities of those provisions" is to be avoided.
However, this case establishes that Part 5 does not apply to accidents where someone – anyone at all – is at fault.
This determination is equally applicable to claims brought under the Motor Accident Compensation Act 1999. Whilst the relevant definition of a no-fault (or blameless) accident, s 7A, is in largely identical terms, the issue had not been determined in a superior jurisdiction.
This case also supports the proposition that in single‑vehicle accidents where no other person is at fault, such as those involving bee stings or kangaroos on the road, s 5.2(1) does not operate to deem fault in the injured person. As Fagan J observed, to conclude otherwise would be to subvert a scheme where fault in the causation of the accident is the criterion for terminating statutory benefits at 26 weeks. Legislative amendment to Part 5 will be necessary to give certainty to this interpretation.
Given the obscurities identified by the Supreme Court, it is difficult to know for sure whether its interpretation accords with what the Parliament had intended. The outcome potentially broadens the insurance risk, with possible implications for scheme costs.
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